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How Requests Give Reasons: The Epistemic Account versus Schaber's Value Account
Published in Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Volume: 26
Issue: 3
Pages: 397 - 403
I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any new reasons but instead simply reveal information. For instance, my request that you X reveals that I desire that you X, and my desire gives you a reason to X. Peter Schaber has recently attacked both the epistemic account and other theories of the reason-giving force of requests. Schaber defends a new theory of the reason-giving force of requests according to which request give reasons because it is valuable for requesters and requestees that requests have this power. In this paper I argue that Schaber's attack on the epistemic account fails, and that his own theory ought to be rejected because it faces compelling objections. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
About the journal
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Open AccessNo