Most states lack the ability to maintain a uniform presence at the local level. While in some places, citizens experience an attentive and present state that is quick to address their demands, in other parts, the same state can be unresponsive and absent. The unevenness in state presence shapes its capacity to delivery services and its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. What explains the spatial unevenness in local state presence? This paper argues that the transfer preferences of mid-level bureaucrats are an important determinant of local state presence. Using a mixed-methods approach that combines insights from qualitative fieldwork and a unique dataset on the transfers history of mid-level bureaucrats in Indian land bureaucracy, I show that bureaucrats have strong transfer preferences and regularly lobby to avoid being placed in jurisdictions further away from their homes or being relocated over long distances. Jurisdictions less preferred by bureaucrats are more likely to experience state absence at the local level. Further, spatial disparities in local state absence are concentrated according to historical patterns of development across different regions of the state; historically less developed regions with lower bureaucratic representation within the state and experience a more prolonged duration of bureaucratic absence on account of bureaucratic lobbying against transfer directives. This paper highlights the importance of transfer preferences of individual bureaucrats and their collective representation in shaping the quality of local governance.