Ashoka University is a private university located in Sonipat, Haryana, India, focusing on liberal arts and sciences. It was established in 2014.&nbsp;It is guided by an academic council of academics and scholars from around the world. The council sets the university&#39;s academic standard, advising on matters of curriculum, faculty hiring and research.&nbsp;

Ashoka University offers a full-time 3 (+ 1) year undergraduate programme. The University comprises of&nbsp;2500 plus students, with a mix of both national and international students.&nbsp; &nbsp;

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Ashoka University

While increasing average years of school has been a development priority for decades, the associated fiscal costs and benefits have been less studied, in part because of the lack of appropriate data. Recently UNESCO organized a project measuring the extent of subsidies {\ldots}

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Mind the Gap: Schooling, Informality and Fiscal Externalities in Nepal

Page 1. Third-party Audit and Tax Compliance – Evidence from a Notched Policy in India ⇤ Click here for the latest version {\ldots} One way to circumvent the problem of low tax revenue is to rely on private agents to increase tax compliance. Though such policies are quite pervasive {\ldots}

Third-party Audit and Tax Compliance–Evidence from a Notched Policy in India

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India is one of the largest public employment programs in the developing world. It was introduced by the central government led by Indian National Congress (INC). While it's implementation is, in principle, based on demand for work from households, we investigate how political competition affects intra district allocation of funds under the scheme. Using longitudinal data on funds allocated to blocks and elections held for block councils, we find that greater amount of funds were allocated to blocks where INC had lower seat share. Further, we address the issue of endogeneity by focusing on a subsample of blocks where the aggregate vote share of INC was close to that of it's rivals. Our results suggest that 1.5 percentage point more funds were approved for blocks that had 1 percentage point lower seat share for INC. We also provide a mechanism for the effect by showing that the results are only true when the MP of the district, a member of the body that approves the block fund allocation, is from INC.